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RECONCILING COLONIAL MEMORIES 
IN KOREA AND JAPAN
David Hundt and Roland Bleiker
The Republic of Korea and Japan share a tumultuous his-
tory, but arguably no period has caused greater trauma in
bilateral relations than the twentieth century. After Japan’s
four-decade long colonial occupation of Korea, the two coun-
tries took two decades just to establish diplomatic relations.
Subsequent interactions have remained seriously compromised
by the memory of colonialism. This article reviews the tensions
behind the tempestuous bilateral relationship, focusing on the
depiction of Japan’s wartime past in school textbooks. We
advance three suggestions for reconciliation: viewing reconcili-
ation not as the restoration of a harmonious pre-conflict order,
but as an ongoing, incomplete process; expanding promising
bilateral dialogues; and accepting that there will always be dif-
ferences between Korea and Japan, most notably with regard to
representations of the past. Rather than being an inevitable
source of conflict, these differences should contribute to an
ongoing process of negotiation between the two neighbors.
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Introduction
Japan and South Korea have much in common, from shared
cultural values to interlinked economic interests and a common
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desire to contain the threat of North Korea. Both countries are
liberal democracies. Both have made remarkable economic
progress over several decades. And both have close political and
security ties with the United States. But despite these strong
bonds, significant problems often hamper the bilateral relation-
ship between Tokyo and Seoul. The key source of tension is the
memory of Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea during the first
half of the twentieth century. Although more than sixty years in
the past, the wounds of that period are still fresh enough to gen-
erate significant political obstacles.
All political communities are in one way or another formed
around questions of memory, most notably around how past
traumas are used to construct a sense of shared purpose and
identity. This process of identity formation is as inevitable as it
is problematic. But the issues at stake are particularly significant
and sensitive in Northeast Asia. Both Japan and South Korea
have constructed their sense of national identity around a partic-
ular understanding of the past. And in many instances these
understandings stand in sharp contrast to each other, thus gen-
erating regular political tension. The consequences of such ten-
sions could be quite substantial, for a close relationship between
Japan and South Korea may well be necessary to address a
range of future security challenges in the region, such as dealing
with a volatile North Korea or finding ways to mediate a possi-
ble clash between the United States and an increasingly power-
ful China.
Perhaps the most important (and certainly the most symbolic)
point of friction is the manner in which Japanese school text-
books depict the actions of the imperial army in Korea, China
and other countries. Strong disagreements have emerged
between South Korea and Japan on how to represent this colonial
period, and how to teach the respective “facts” to future genera-
tions. Korea regularly accuses Japan of painting a far too benevo-
lent picture of the past—a picture that does not adequately rec-
ognize the pain and trauma inflicted by Japan’s aggression and
subsequent occupation of the peninsula. From a Korean perspec-
tive, Japanese leaders frequently exacerbate the situation by play-
ing down the extent of the imperial army’s responsibility for ini-
tiating and conducting war. Symbolic of this attitude are regular
visits of prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine, designed to
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honor the spirits of the war dead, including convicted war crimi-
nals. This act is seen in Japan as a way of respecting the past and
affirming a sense of national identity, but in Korea the same
actions are perceived as a form of disrespect, even aggression.
The clash between these different representations of the past
has been publicly debated for years. Politicians and intellectuals
in both Korea and Japan comment on them, with positions rang-
ing anywhere from hostile accusation to attempts at compro-
mise. But no lasting resolution seems in sight. The impasse
remains as fundamental as ever, and significant political tensions
over the issue of historical representation resurface on a regular
basis.
The purpose of our article is to analyze the reasons for this
recurring impasse and, more importantly, to arrive at theoreti-
cally informed but practically relevant suggestions about how to
address them. After identifying tensions between Korea and
Japan we focus in particular on competing understandings of
the past. We observe the evolution and significance of disagree-
ments about history textbooks, demonstrating how they remain
a source of tension. We also pay attention to the Yasukuni issue
and how it links past and present in a highly symbolic manner
for both Japan and Korea.
The second part of the article then advances three sugges-
tions about how to promote a culture of reconciliation between
Japan and Korea. First, we stress the need to view reconciliation
not, as is commonly done, as an attempt to restore some authen-
tic, pre-conflict harmony between the parties engaged. Instead,
we highlight the inherently political and ongoing process of rec-
onciliation: the fact that both parties need to be aware of the
problematic nature of coming to terms with a violent colonial
past. Second, we stress the importance of dialogue, particularly
the need to exchange ideas about how to represent (and teach)
an understanding of history that is acceptable to both sides.
While substantial progress has been made in this realm, most
notably with the joint production of a history textbook in 2005,
we also highlight a third, less recognized component: the need
to accept that there will always be differences in how the past is
represented and understood. Rather than seeing them as an
inevitable source of conflict, differences in historical under-
standing should be recognized as part of a normal, ongoing, and
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perhaps even enriching process of negotiation between two
respectful neighboring states.
A disclaimer is in order before we can start our inquiry.
Relations between Japan and South Korea do, of course, take
place in a larger context of highly complex regional political and
economic interactions. Given the limited scope of this article, we
can touch only marginally on related issues. As a result, there
will, for instance, be no detailed engagement with the highly
significant economic dimensions of bilateral relations. Nor will
there be any analysis of the division of the Korean peninsula
and of the threat that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions pose. The
latter is of equal concern to Seoul and Tokyo and forms an
important part of political dynamics in the region. Finally, our
focus on South Korean reactions to Japanese school textbooks
needs to be placed in context. Japan is, of course, not the only
country to be accused of teaching its national history in a highly
politicized manner. The political appropriation of education in
both Koreas is just as apparent. This is not surprising given the
tumultuous century of occupation and division that the penin-
sula has endured. Dennis Hart, for instance, stresses that school
textbooks present “tales of national identity” that reflect the
very specific and politically motivated preferences of both North
and South Korea.1 In the North Korean case, a strong discourse
of anti-imperialism, focused largely on the role of Japan and the
United States, is an essential element of national mythology.
Highly significant as the related political dynamics are, a brief
essay—like the present one—cannot engage them in detail. Our
purpose remains limited to examining the interactions between
South Korea and Japan.
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The Roots of Persisting Tensions
Japanese Colonialism in Korea
Constituting a natural link between the Asian mainland and
Japan, the Korean peninsula has always been an important factor
in the security policy of the surrounding powers. It is also likely
to remain so in the future. The importance of the peninsula inten-
sified particularly at the end of the nineteenth century. In the
wake of the entry of the Western powers into East Asia, Korea
and its neighbors were forced to open up in the mid-1870s. Ush-
ered into action by the appearance of Commodore Matthew
Perry’s “Black Ships” in the 1850s, Japan sought to join the impe-
rial contest in an attempt to avoid exploitation at the hands of the
West. Influence over Korea was seen as essential in this process.
In 1876 Japan became the first country (other than China) to
establish formal diplomatic ties with Korea. A decade later
Japanese ambitions regarding the peninsula started to become
more menacing, particularly when the minister of war, Yamagata
Aritomo, linked Japanese independence to a dual defense strate-
gy. He argued that besides Japan’s line of sovereignty running
along its borders, Tokyo also had to defend a certain line of inter-
est. The Korean peninsula, Yamagata reasoned, was within this
line of interest because whoever occupied it would wield enor-
mous control over East Asia.2 As a result, Japan fought two wars
for the control of Korea, one in 1894-1895 against China, the other
in 1904-1905 against Tsarist Russia. The outcome of these con-
flicts was the basis for Korea’s annexation into the Japanese colo-
nial empire in 1910.
Although Japanese control of the peninsula ended in 1945,
the colonial period remains firmly embedded in the collective
memory of the Korean people. For Japan, Korea was the first
step toward the goal of regional dominance. During the occupa-
tion, the Japanese colonial administration tried everything possi-
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ble to eradicate Korean identity—to the point that schools were
not allowed to teach Korean history, culture, or language. Koreans
were forced to adopt Japanese names and to worship at Shinto
shrines, thus affirming their fealty to the Japanese emperor. The
Korean economy was forcibly incorporated into the Japanese
imperial project, disrupting the traditional lifestyles of millions
of people. All attempts to thwart colonial control were brutally
suppressed, although guerilla forces such as that headed by future
North Korean president Kim Il Sung defied the Japanese until
1945. Without an appreciation of the harshness of the occupation,
and the traumatic impact it had on Korea and its sense of identity,
it is impossible to understand the sensitivity that surrounds cur-
rent disagreements on questions of historical representation.
Post-War Tensions Despite Rapprochement
In the process of dismantling the Japanese colonial empire,
American and Soviet troops occupied the peninsula, dividing it
into two parts along the thirty-eighth parallel. This arbitrary par-
tition of Korea in 1945, and the ensuing Korean War (1950-1953),
transformed a supposedly provisional settlement into a perma-
nent division of the peninsula. That change must to a substantial
degree be attributed to the strategic and symbolic importance of
Korea in the emerging cold-war power struggle between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Initially the competition over
the Korean peninsula was largely a rivalry between these two
hegemons. However, the struggle for influence in Korea did not
remain a Soviet-American affair. With the Sino-Soviet split in the
early 1960s and the reemergence of Japan as an economic power,
the situation in Korea became directly linked to the security and
economic interests of the four great powers: the United States,
the Soviet Union, China, and Japan.
Despite this increasing regional intertwinement of politics
and economics, relations between Japan and South Korea were
almost nonexistent during the first two decades of the post-war
period. The two countries established official diplomatic ties
only in 1965, and only then under pressure from the United
States. Strategic calculations were the primary reason why
Washington wanted to resolve the diplomatic impasse between
Japan and Korea. The United States sought to coordinate its var-
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ious bilateral alliances in East Asia in a more coherent alliance
network. This became especially important during the mid-
1960s, when Washington searched for allies that could partic-
ipate in the unpopular war in Viet Nam. Because memories of
Japan’s militaristic past were still far too fresh, Washington
expected Tokyo to play a primarily logistical role, which it did.
South Korea, in turn, contributed ground troops to Indochina. In
return the United States integrated Seoul closer into its alliance
network and financed an expansion of South Korea’s military
capacities.
Economic reasons also motivated the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan. Washington
sought to encourage a mutually beneficial scenario whereby
South Korea would serve as a market for Japanese manufac-
tured goods, and Japanese firms would invest in Korea. The
result was a process that re-created the economic sphere that
had existed during the colonial period. A brief look at Korean
economic development in the post-war period reveals that this
strategy was a resounding success. Japan has indeed served as
an economic model for South Korea. For instance, the latter has
adopted many of Japan’s basic strategies of development, from a
state-led industrialization process to the promotion of an export-
oriented manufacturing sector.3
Without the push from Washington the initiation of a rap-
prochement between Tokyo and Seoul would most likely have
taken much longer, and South Korea may not have enjoyed such
high rates of economic growth in the past few decades. But the
burgeoning economic relationship between Japan and Korea has
come at a heavy price. The fostering of economic relations was a
response to the strategic-military problem that the United States
faced in the 1960s. However, this did not adequately address the
underlying political issues in Korean-Japanese relations. It is thus
not surprising that the atmosphere of the newly established bilat-
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eral relationship remained rather distant and formal initially.
Reasons for the odd combination of a close economic collab-
oration with rather distant political relations can be found within
the internal dynamics in both Japan and South Korea. Park
Chung Hee, South Korea’s president from 1961 until his assassi-
nation eighteen years later, had numerous reasons to establish
closer ties with Japan. He had served in the Japanese imperial
army. Park was also a noted admirer of the Japanese state, despite
the calamities that it had wrought upon his own country. He was
particularly drawn to the idea that national security and economic
development were two sides of the same coin. Termed fukoku
kyohei (“rich country, strong army”), the slogan served as one of
the guiding principles of Meiji-era Japan. Upon his seizure of
power via a military coup in 1961, Park sought to imitate the
Japanese model by establishing a strong state that could then
drive the process of national development. Normalizing relations
with Japan was an opportunity for Park to achieve what he con-
sidered to be two key goals at once: to ensure the ongoing sup-
port of the U.S. and to launch a process of economic development.
But Park’s desire to normalize relations with Japan faced a
major political obstacle: the memory of Japan’s colonial occupa-
tion. Park knew that most South Koreans fervently opposed nor-
malization. Even though his regime had a substantial security
apparatus and proved willing to suppress challenges to its
authority, promoting normalization with Japan was a significant
political risk for Park. Tellingly, Park justified the renewal of
diplomatic ties with Japan in terms of Korea’s obligations to its
cold-war patron, the United States, which had come to the res-
cue of the South in 1950. He also used Korea’s position in the
anti-communist alliance system to justify the dispatch of troops
to Indochina. Little or no mention was made of the importance
of reaching some sort of reconciliation with Japan. As a result,
there was never a substantial public debate within South Korea
about the merits and demerits of normalizing relations with
Japan, leaving a major gap in how the population perceives its
powerful neighbor. This is one of the reasons why anti-Japanese
sentiments remained highly prominent even in the 1990s and
beyond. The democratization of Korea from the late 1980s pro-
vided an opening for long-held and long-repressed feelings of
resentment to emerge. A popular undercurrent of anger thus
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remained and manifested itself in large-scale demonstrations
against Japanese leaders who dared defend their country’s
wartime record or make statements perceived as slighting Korea.
Questions of reconciliation (or even normalization) were
addressed in an equally inadequate manner within Japan. Instead
of reaching an adequate political settlement with the peoples of its
former colonies, Japan’s interaction with the region has largely
been economic in nature. For instance, political relations with
China have for decades remained basic at best, problematic at
worst. This uneven regional engagement can be traced back to the
so-called Yoshida Doctrine, which foresaw that Japan would rely
on the United States for its security so that it could devote itself to
economic recovery.4 The structures of the cold-war alliance sys-
tem thus held back, at least to some extent, a process of regional
political engagement that could have dismantled some of the
tensions among former enemies. They are also one of the main
reasons why there has been far too little critical evaluation of
Japan’s war record within the country itself.
The lack of normalization—and the related tension—between
Japan and South Korea became more visible with the move into
a post-cold war order. The dissolution of the USSR weakened
the rationale for the American presence in Northeast Asia. The
United States thus wants its allies to accept a larger share of the
burden of ensuring regional stability. Seen from Washington,
the most obvious candidate for taking on greater regional
responsibility is Japan. It has one of the biggest economies in the
world alongside a relatively low level of defense spending. The
scale and sophistication of Japan’s military are nonetheless sub-
stantial, all the more since it has started to feel less constrained
by the so-called Peace Constitution that U.S. occupation forces
imposed on the country after the war. Tokyo has also tried to
leave behind the constraints of the Yoshida Doctrine and adopt
a more “normal” foreign policy. In some ways this transition
parallels the situation in Europe, where the task consisted of
finding a modus operandi with the wartime aggressor, Germany.
And here the model suggests that successful economic integra-
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tion eventually resulted in more intimate political ties.5
But the situation in East Asia has turned out to be different.
China and both Koreas are inherently suspicious of Japanese
ambitions in the region. Victims of Japan’s wartime aggression,
these countries fear that Japanese influence is reemerging despite
Tokyo having not yet fully acknowledged and apologized for its
highly problematic actions in the past.6 Until Japan has success-
fully embarked on a process that the Germans call Vergangenheits-
bewältigung (coming to terms with the past), countries such as
South Korea believe that Tokyo is unfit to play a bigger regional
role.
The Past as a Source of Conflict: Japan’s History Textbooks
The main source of tension between South Korea and Japan
is thus the past. Or, to be more precise, the two sides differ
markedly in their understandings of what took place in the past
and how the politicians in the present should represent and
account for those differences.
The past can, of course, never be remembered authentically.
A certain selection of facts, perspectives, and interpretations
shapes all understandings of history. The combination of forget-
ting and remembering is inevitable in this process. History, in
this sense, is as much about the present and the future as it is
about the past. At the time an event takes place there is no memo-
ry. Historical awareness emerges later and by necessity includes
values and interests that have nothing to do with the original
occurrence. History is thus one of the prime sites of politics, as
Nietzsche was well aware. He was particularly critical of peri-
ods during which historical understandings lacked critical
awareness of this process—situations, say, when powerful rulers
failed to gain legitimacy on their own and thus relied on the
misappropriation of historical figures and events to justify par-
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ticular forms of governance, even dominance.7 Signs of such
political appropriation of history are certainly evident in both
Japan and Korea, where the past is still far too close and far too
traumatic to allow for even a remotely objective agreement about
historical facts.
One of the most contentious issues between South Korea
and Japan has indeed revolved around how to represent the
past—most notably the imperial and colonial period—in history
textbooks. Before we engage the issues at stake it is necessary to
stress that education is one of the most central societal mecha-
nisms through which histories and political identities are pro-
duced, reproduced, and entrenched. Laura Hein and Mark
Selden argue that “schools and textbooks are important vehicles
through which contemporary societies transmit ideas of citizen-
ship and both the idealized past and the promised future of a
community.”8 What students learn during the first few years of
their lives inevitably influences their political and social attitude
for decades to come. While narratives of nationhood create
boundaries between self and other from the very beginning of
the educational cycle, secondary school education plays a partic-
ularly crucial political role. It is at this level that historical narra-
tives are first taught in detail, thereby providing interpretive
and factual foundations for the previously established sense of
identity.9 School education is thus a powerful way of promoting
a particular form of political socialization. The objectives of a
state can often be achieved most effectively “at a distance,”
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through various mechanisms that seem, at first sight, of a non-
political nature. They include not only education but also the
organization of welfare, health, town planning, and the regula-
tion of crime and the economy.10
Public perception in Korea and elsewhere often suggests
that Japanese textbooks have ignored the war and the pain
Japan inflicted upon the peoples of surrounding countries. The
situation is, however, less static and more complex. Reflecting
larger political patterns, periods of conservative historical atti-
tudes sometimes gave way to more progressive ones, only to
yield again to more hardened positions.
Japanese history textbooks, like those in most countries,
have been revised about once every four years. The Japanese
Ministry of Education has the power to “oversee,” and if neces-
sary correct, these revisions. Perhaps more than in other coun-
tries, political motives have driven this practice. The most con-
tentious issues have often revolved not around what was added
to the narrative about sensitive periods, such as war or occupa-
tion, but around what was omitted. For instance, the Japanese
textbooks produced soon after the end of the war were largely
factual accounts of the atrocities committed by the imperial
army. But in the 1950s, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) government sought to erase mention of events such as the
Nanjing Massacre.
During the mid-1990s a turn took place toward a signifi-
cantly more critical appraisal of Japanese history. This transition
was facilitated by the removal from power of the more conserv-
ative elements of the Japanese polity. The long reign of the LDP
ended in 1993. Power passed to the more progressive Social
Democratic Party (SDP) and others from outside the traditional
political elite. Several symbolic steps soon followed. With the
LDP in opposition, the Japanese parliament (Diet) marked the
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fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end by passing a resolution that
stressed the need to learn from the past. Although the resolution
was passed with less than half of Diet members in attendance, it
was nonetheless considered an important step toward a more
critical engagement with the nation’s problematic imperial
past.11 This changing attitude was also reflected in history text-
book publication. For instance, the factually more accurate term
“invasion” was reintroduced after it had previously been dropped
in favor of a more “neutral” vocabulary. The textbooks that
were released in the early and mid-1990s also included accounts
of events that were previously ignored, such as the active role
that the Japanese government played in coercing women from
Korea and other occupied territories into sexual slavery.12
This shift in historical consciousness within Japan, symbolic
and minimal though it was, contributed to an improvement in
relations with South Korea. Of further benefit to this process was
the election of Kim Dae Jung, a former dissident, as South Korea’s
president in 1998. Reacting to Tokyo’s opening, Kim pursued a
more conciliatory stance toward Japan. He did so largely against
public sentiments in Korea, which were at this time still largely
hostile to Japan. Kim nevertheless called for the two countries to
put the past behind them. He chose a symbolic first step by agree-
ing to reduce, and subsequently eliminate, longstanding barriers
to more sustained cultural relations. For instance, he lifted a long-
standing ban on Japanese movies and cartoons. Koreans had
maintained this ban due to widespread fears that Japan would
once again seek to dominate their country and erase their identity,
as it did during the colonial period. The high point of Kim’s Japan
diplomacy came during his October 1998 visit to Tokyo. Accord-
ing to the official transcript of the president’s meeting with then
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Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, Kim stressed that “the pre-
sent calls upon both countries to overcome their unfortunate histo-
ry and to build a future-oriented relationship based on reconcilia-
tion as well as good-neighborly and friendly cooperation.”13
The Reemergence of Tension over School Textbooks
The 1990s thus witnessed a more conciliatory approach to
the issue of history teaching, which also led to an improvement
of relations between Japan and Korea. A basis for reconciliation
appeared to be forming. But by the end of the decade things
started to change again for the worse. Signs of a return to a more
conservative position had already started to emerge in Japan.
Just as the LDP’s absence from power created the conditions for
a more tolerant understanding of history, so the party’s return
to power in 1996 gradually increased conservative pressures for
Japan to stop apologizing for the past. To conservative forces in
Japan, the insertion of references to issues such as the “Nanjing
Massacre” into school textbooks was a problematic concession
towards what is sometimes termed a “politically correct” or
“black armband” view of history in countries such as Australia
and the United States. Why, conservatives asked, should Japan
be forced to repeatedly apologize for things that happened long
ago, especially when some inaccuracies have been found between
accounts of those events? Conservatives thus tended to see com-
plaints about history textbooks primarily as attempts by Japan’s
neighbors to prevent Tokyo from assuming a more self-confi-
dent role as an important regional power.
Subsequent LDP governments allowed textbooks to be
revised in ways that are far less critical of Japan’s wartime past
than the versions released in the first half of the 1990s. As the
changes became more prominent the South Korean government
began to publicly oppose them. It did, for instance, suggest more
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than thirty changes to new and existing textbooks released in
2001. The issues Korea highlighted included the inadequate men-
tion of the forcible annexation of Korea into the Japanese empire
and Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea in 1592.14 Most com-
plaints related to changes made to the New History Textbook. This
textbook was produced by the conservative Senkai Shimbun’s
Fusosha publishing house and commissioned by the Japanese
Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi Kyo¯kasho o
Tsukuru Kai), a nationalist organization that has vehemently criti-
cized the version of history that appeared in Japanese textbooks
in the 1990s.
The history debate recently intensified again when the Tokyo
metropolitan government approved a new version of Fusosha’s
textbook for use in 2005. As was the case four years previously,
South Korea and China complained that this textbook presented
Japanese schoolchildren with a distorted view of their country’s
wartime actions. A Korean non-governmental organization, the
Asian Peace and Harmony Education Network (APHEN), draws
attention to what it believes are the most egregious distortions
in the 2005 version of Fusosha’s textbook. The book claimed that
Koreans participated in colonial institutions, such as the imperi-
al army, for commercial reasons. That is, the textbook gave the
impression that Koreans voluntarily joined the Japanese army to
further their careers. Also implied is that the so-called comfort
women were not victims of war, coerced into sexual slavery by
the imperial army. Instead, the textbook suggests that they were
simply professional prostitutes who chose to work in the Japanese
army, which adequately paid them. APHEN also claims that the
revised history textbook makes no mention of those Japanese who
opposed the war effort, as well as Koreans and Chinese who
resisted Japanese rule. The overall impression is that there was lit-
tle or no resistance to Japanese domination. Japanese schoolchild-
ren could thus surmise that other countries in East Asia wel-
comed and benefited from Japanese rule.15
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In response to these accusations, Japan’s minister for educa-
tion claimed that the old depiction of history in school textbooks
was simply too “self-torturing” for the country. It stressed,
instead, that Japan should be proud of its history. The minister
later apologized for his remarks as did various other officials.
But the ministry did not use its powers to prevent the publica-
tion of the Fusosha textbook in its “revised” state.16
Reacting to this changing Japanese attitude, the new South
Korean president, Roh Moo Hyun, signaled a departure from
the conciliatory approach of his predecessor, Kim Dae Jung.
Seoul explicitly opposed the reemergence of Japan as an active
regional power unless Tokyo first acknowledged its wartime
past and assumed responsibility for ensuring that current and
future generations of schoolchildren have access to a full account
of relevant historical facts about their country’s involvement in
the war. Roh stressed that “we can no longer stand by and just
watch [Japan’s] intentions to realize hegemony once again.”17 In
concrete terms this meant that South Korea would oppose a
stronger global role for Japan, such as a possible permanent seat
on the United Nations Security Council.
There is, of course, no uniform agreement in Japan about
how its imperial past ought to be represented today. There are
heated debates about how to deal with the textbook issue and
related political challenges. Indeed, some of the most vociferous
criticism of a conservative, patriotic rendition of Japanese history
has come from within Japan itself, rather than from countries
such as China and South Korea. A coalition of leftist politicians,
liberal intellectuals, and schoolteachers had, in fact, succeeded in
removing at least some of the most obvious inadequacies from
textbook presentation of the imperial army’s past.18 A number of
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civic groups, led by Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21,
also protested specifically against Fusosha’s new textbook. The
Japan Teachers’ Union went as far as to indicate that its members
would resist pressure from the Ministry of Education to adopt
the book. So far the book has indeed not been widely used. The
Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform aimed at an adop-
tion rate of 10 percent, but initial estimates indicated that less
than 1 percent of Japanese schools decided to use the book.19 In
other words, the proportion of Japanese schoolchildren exposed
to the less critical version of their country’s history is not yet sig-
nificant. But this does not change the fact that the new textbook,
and the public debates surrounding it, remain a major source of
tension in relations between Japan and Korea.
Politicizing the Past: 
Yasukuni Shrine between Japan and South Korea
Statements and gestures by Japanese leaders have further
intensified the most recent round of disagreements with South
Korea. The most significant—and symbolically charged—of them
were the repeated visits of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to
the Yasukuni Shrine. Yasukuni honors Japan’s war dead, includ-
ing several politicians and military leaders who were executed
for war crimes. The government in Seoul saw these visits as high-
ly public and symbolic attempts to legitimize Japan’s aggression
prior to and during the war. South Korea, as well as other vic-
tims of Japan’s imperial ambitions, thus interpreted the visits as a
clear refusal of Japan’s current leaders to disassociate themselves
from the country’s problematic past.
Koizumi was not the first senior politician to visit the shrine
in the post-war period, not even since the enshrinement of sev-
eral war criminals in the late 1970s. Prime Minister Nakasone
Yasuhiro’s visit in 1985 attracted particularly widespread media
coverage—and a strong reaction from neighboring countries.
Prime ministerial visits then ceased until 1996, when Hashimoto
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Ryutaro visited the shrine upon the return to power of the LDP.
That visit again provoked a strong public protest from China
and Korea. Hashimoto’s successors abstained from visiting the
shrine, at least in a public function. But senior LDP politicians
began to visit the shrine more openly in a “private capacity.”20
Tokyo’s conservative governor, Ishihara Shintaro, has also visit-
ed the shrine on several occasions in an official capacity.
Koizumi made one visit to the shrine for each of the six
years that he served as prime minister, usually on or about the
anniversary of the end of World War II. For instance in May
2001, the prime minister announced that he would visit Yasuku-
ni on August 15 in a private capacity. He flagged the likelihood
of repeat visits, which would be in an official capacity. The reac-
tion from China and Korea was predictably negative, sparking
another cycle of recriminations between Japan and its neighbors.
Perhaps to appease the sentiments of other countries in the
region, Koizumi visited the shrine two days prior to the sensitive
anniversary of the war’s end.21 Further visits took place in subse-
quent years, causing repeated bouts of opposition in China and
Korea. For instance, after Koizumi’s January 2004 visit, President
Roh said: “a national leader should not behave like a thoughtless
person or a politician hungry for popularity.”22 The fifth visit
took place in October 2005, in response to which the leaders of
both South Korea and China cancelled their scheduled summits
with Koizumi at the following month’s Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Pusan. These leaders also can-
celled a trilateral summit at the ASEAN (Association of South-
east Asian Nations)-Plus-Three gathering in December.23
The timing of the sixth and final visit was arguably the most
controversial, falling on August 15, 2006. Once again Japan’s
neighbors took umbrage at what they considered to be an act of
gross insensitivity. At the same time it was well known that
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Koizumi’s retirement was impending, and that no further dam-
age could be done to relations with Korea and China. There were
hopes that Koizumi’s successor, Abe Shinzo, would adopt a more
circumspect approach to the shrine visits.24 But at this writing
Abe’s intentions are unclear.
The main reasons for Japan’s seemingly stubborn insistence
on maintaining these visits seem to be linked to the perceived
need to establish a more self-confident sense of national identity,
one that is linked to pride about Japan’s role in the region and
the world as a whole. Koizumi, in particular, seemed intent on
leaving a legacy of a more confident Japan. He represented parts
of the political spectrum that believe the country has apologized
sufficiently for the past. Korea and China, so this argument goes,
will never be satisfied with Japan’s apologies. They will always
hold the past against Japan. This is why conservative elements
in Japan see the past as something that its neighbors must sim-
ply “get over.” The most radical representatives of this position
hold that, as a result, Japan should neither feel constrained by its
neighbors nor try to appease them. It should simply pursue its
own approach to the teaching of history or the formulation of
foreign policy.25
As with the specific issue of textbooks, the symbolic visits to
Yasukuni are far from uncontroversial within Japan. They are
hotly debated. Not everybody agrees with the prevailing govern-
mental line. The editor-in-chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun, Watanabe
Tsuneo, broke with conservative ranks by calling for a resolution
of the history issue. In an interview in early 2006 he stressed how
Yasukuni acts as a symbolic impediment to better relations with
other countries in the region. Watanabe clearly pointed out that
the “Yasukuni Shrine operates a war museum that incites mili-
tarism and displays exhibits in praise of militarism. It is wrong for
the Prime Minister to visit such a place.”26 This is not an isolated
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position. Others too think that the Yasukuni controversy does not
serve the national interest. Indeed the current Japanese head of
state, Emperor Akihito, who has played a key role in improving
relations with Korea, has never visited the shrine. And it was
revealed in July 2006 that Akihito’s father and the wartime
emperor, Hirohito, stopped visiting the shrine in the 1970s after
he discovered that it housed the spirits of war criminals.27 Thus,
just as conservative politicians began publicly visiting the shrine
as an illustration of national pride, the emperor—the embodiment
of the nation—deemed it inappropriate to do so.
Reconciliation as an Ongoing Political Project
Some form of reconciliation between Japan and South Korea
is still needed, even though the two countries have long normal-
ized economic and diplomatic relations. The task ahead is not
gargantuan either. Economic relations are relatively close already
and no military conflict is likely to break out between these
neighbors. But problems nevertheless exist and they continue to
hamper collaborative efforts. Political, security, economic, and
cultural relations would improve substantially if Tokyo and
Seoul were to find a basic agreement on how to deal with their
diverging approaches to representing and dealing with the past.
And such an improvement is badly needed to deal with various
security challenges, from dealing with the threat of North Korea
to finding ways of integrating an increasingly powerful China
into the region. A close working relationship between South
Korea and Japan could provide substantial stability to a region
that could otherwise experience serious tension and conflict.
We make three suggestions here about how to advance the
process of reconciliation. The first point is a basic one, related to
the conceptualization of reconciliation as such. The concept has
gained particular prominence in the post-cold war period. It
usually refers to attempts at establishing basic political stability
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in societies divided by the memory of a violent past. Prominent
examples include South Africa’s effort to overcome the effects of
the apartheid period and attempts to embark on peacebuilding
processes in places like East Timor, Bosnia, and Rwanda, where
devastating ethnic conflicts had torn apart much of the societal
fabric. Other examples include political processes in Australia
and Canada, where tension persists between the majority settler
community and the (largely decimated) indigenous population.
Although usually associated with processes of healing with-
in a certain society or political system, the concept of reconcilia-
tion can also apply to bilateral relationships, such as between
Japan and Korea. The idea of reconciliation is, indeed, part of a
long tradition, rooted in Christendom and linked to key modern
philosophers, such as Hegel. But this Western heritage is, of
course, also linked to particular Western values. It is thus rea-
sonable to question whether or not the concept of reconciliation
can or should be applied to a fundamentally different cultural
environment in Northeast Asia. Some of the traditional under-
standings of reconciliation are, indeed, rather problematic. This
is particularly the case with approaches that see reconciliation as
an effort to establish some form of authentic political and social
harmony: an original situation of idyllic relations that is said to
have existed prior to the conflict in question. In a quasi-religious
manner these approaches seek to establish idealized notions of
community, but by doing so risk preventing, rather than encour-
aging, political understanding of the reconciliation process.
The task of reconciliation, then, is not to restore a pre-con-
flict order, but to create a new one. Andrew Schaap, through
extensive scholarship on the subject, recognizes this danger. He
stresses that reconciliation is not about settling accounts or
restoring preexisting relationships between parties in conflict.
The key task, he insists, is of a more intricate and perhaps also
more unsettling nature. It consists of actually enacting “a radical
break with the social order that underpinned the violence of the
past.”28 Schaap furthermore stresses that this process cannot be
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determined in advance, fixed through some universal code that
is good for all places and times. Rather, reconciliation must be
seen as an ongoing, even open-ended process. It is one rooted
less in a set of laws and procedures than in what some scholars
called an “ethos of critical engagement”: a form of ethics that
promotes respect for multiple parties and perspectives.29
Engaging the residues of deep-seated antagonisms, as they
still exist between Korea and Japan, is neither easy nor straight-
forward. This is all the more the case if one conceptualizes rec-
onciliation, as Schaap does, as “openness to listen to those who
appear to us unreasonable and a willingness to question what
counts as reasonable political speech.”30
We now seek to spell out what such an open-ended approach
to reconciliation would look like in the context of the difficult
relationship between Japan and South Korea. And we do so by
focusing on two key tasks: first, promoting dialogue to reach at
least a basic understanding of what happened in the past, and
how this past should be represented; and second, dealing with
the inevitable differences that remain once such a process of dia-
logue has been exhausted.
Reconciliation as a Dialogue about the Past
Susan Dwyer identifies three stages in the process of recon-
ciliation, particularly in the context of coming to terms with
traumatic events that took place in the past. The first, she says,
consists of an effort to find agreement on “the barest of facts.”
The second stage involves identifying a range of different inter-
pretations of the respective events. And the third stage entails
narrowing things down to a limited set of interpretations that
the two sides can tolerate. While such a goal of agreeing to dis-
agree seems modest, the way toward it is littered with seeming-
ly insurmountable obstacles. The first hurdle alone is huge, for
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Dwyer defines agreeing on “the barest of facts” as finding a
clear view on “who did what to whom and when.”31 Disagree-
ments between South Korea and Japan exist precisely on this
issue—establishing exactly “who did what to whom and when.”
While the end point envisaged by Dwyer’s understanding
of reconciliation is highly ambitious, perhaps even elusive, the
route she maps out is compelling and, indeed, necessary. Recon-
ciliation cannot take place without the parties in conflict engag-
ing in a dialogue about what happened in the past. Such a dia-
logue starts with the simple task of comparing different under-
standings of past events. Richard Kearney refers to this process
as an “exchange of narrative memories.” Although writing in the
context of Northern Ireland, Kearney’s recommendation is just
as relevant for reconciliation between South Korea and Japan,
for such exchanges would allow the opposing sides to “see each
other through alternative eyes.”32
A History-making Initiative
We now examine the potential and limit of reaching dialogi-
cal agreements on past events by focusing on a particular and
highly promising recent initiative, the so-called History Opens the
Future project. The Kim Dae Jung government initiated the pro-
ject in 2001 in collaboration with its Japanese counterpart. It is
noteworthy that the project began prior to Koizumi’s ascension
to the office of prime minister. It brought together historians,
educators, scholars, and NGO representatives from China, Japan,
and South Korea, who collectively faced the very problem of con-
flicting memories of the past. They started by comparing differ-
ent understandings of the turbulent relations between these three
countries during and after the end of the nineteenth century.33
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This project is intended to supplement, not replace, existing his-
tory textbooks in each country. The objective was thus different
from those of normal history textbooks. Most history textbooks
either recount national histories or cover specific events or peri-
ods from a particular, nationalist perspective. The authors of His-
tory Opens the Future, by contrast, sought to provide a single uni-
fied narrative of one of the most controversial periods in North-
east Asian history.
Trying to arrive at an understanding of history that was as
objective as possible, they drew on sources from all three coun-
tries, including testimony from survivors of that period.34 After
spending several years debating the “bare facts” that needed to
appear in a unified regional narrative, the authors of History
Opens the Future produced a volume that succinctly deals with
key issues. It is thus in the truest sense a textbook, often devot-
ing one to two pages to subtopics before reverting back to an
overall narrative. For instance, the book briefly introduces sensi-
tive issues, such as the comfort women, the Yasukuni Shrine,
and the importance of history textbooks.35 Each of these topics
is presented in a way that encourages readers to draw their own
conclusions about the meaning and significance of the issues at
stake.
Taking this practice one step further, the authors of History
Opens the Future used materials from all three countries. For
instance, the section on relations between Japan and its neigh-
bors during World War II contains the following diverging
points of emphasis. A Korean textbook is cited as stating that
that “due to the war of invasion by the Japanese empire, our
country reverted to a logistics base supplying the resources for
Japan’s war . . . The Japanese empire not only physically plun-
dered Koreans in this way but also forcibly enslaved them and
consigned them to hard labor in mines and factories.” This
account is then juxtaposed with an extract from a Chinese text-
book, which states in part: “The Japanese invaders used arms to
maintain colonial control in the occupied zones. They estab-
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lished institutions such as a military police, a police force, courts
and prisons to repress the Chinese people.” In contrast, a Japanese
textbook is cited as indicating a quite different perspective: “These
[victories of Japanese troops in a series of wars] were victories
that were possible due to the cooperation of people who had
suffered under the colonial yoke of the white man for centuries.
By winning this series of wars, Japan delivered the dream of inde-
pendence to most people in Southeast Asia and India.”36
These three different accounts of the same political dynamic
highlight the difficulty that the authors of the joint history text-
book faced in overcoming what are essentially nationalist accounts
of regional history. The authors sought to tell how Japan invaded
its neighbors over a fifty-year period, and how those neighbors
resisted. The narrative of History Opens the Future focuses on the
themes of invasion and resistance rather than the liberation,
which Japanese textbooks emphasize. The input of the Chinese
and Korean members of the joint committee ensured an emphasis
on how Japan’s invasions violated the sovereignty of other East
Asian countries, while the Japanese account emphasizes that East
Asian countries were not exercising full sovereignty over their
territories prior to Japan’s invasion. One explicit drawback of this
focus is that while Western and Japanese imperialism are proper-
ly scrutinized, there is no mention of other forms of power and
domination that the region has experienced. How, for instance, is
one to assess adequately, and represent to future generations, the
function of U.S. hegemony in the region or China’s often prob-
lematic role in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan?37
History Opens the Future is thus not a comprehensive political
history of the region, nor does it try to be. The range of countries
involved is limited, bringing into question the value of using the
term “East Asia” in the book’s title. Historians from countries
such as North Korea, Viet Nam, and Taiwan would undoubted-
ly dispute some of the “barest of facts” needed to produce such
a textbook. Other contentious issues, such as the ongoing dis-
pute between China and Korea over the status of Goguryeo, also
fall outside the textbook’s objectives. Goguryeo was one of the
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three kingdoms that unified to form the Korean state in the sev-
enth century A.D., but China claims that the kingdom was but
one territory that formed part of the traditional Chinese empire.
It is not at all clear whether China and Korea circa 668 A.D. can
be treated as nation-states—at least in the contemporary under-
standing of the term, with its focus on state sovereignty. And yet
the joint history project treats these countries as full-fledged
nation-states at the end of the nineteenth century, replete for
instance with the capacity to defend a defined territory and pop-
ulation.38 In a similar manner, there is no discussion on ties
between the three countries since the end of World War II. This
avoids issues such as the participation of the People’s Republic
of China in the Korean War, the national division of Korea, as
well as the status of various Chinese territories such as Taiwan.
Despite its shortcomings, the production of the joint history
textbook is one of the most concrete and significant steps taken
toward the problem of diverging understandings of the past. In
their attempt to reach consensus on the bare minimum of facts,
the joint editorial committee faced the difficulty of dealing with
three interpretations of history. The next step for Korean-Japan-
ese relations could be to further reduce the scope for dissension
by producing a joint history textbook on a bilateral basis. Such a
project could cover the most sensitive of issues in the history of
bilateral relations, including Hideyoshi’s war of 1592 and of
course the colonial period. However, it could also address issues
such as cultural exchanges across the millennia, commonalities
in the historical evolution of the two languages, the current status
of ethnic Koreans in Japan, and the contribution of Japan to
Korean economic development.
Reconciliation as Respecting Difference 
in Representations about the Past
The History Opens the Future project highlights two important
86 David Hundt and Roland Bleiker
38. Narida Ryuichi, “‘Dong Asia’-ui Ganeungseong” (The Possibility of “East
Asia”), Changjak-gwa-Bipyeong, No. 131 (February, 2006), pp. 406-10;
Scott Snyder, “A Turning Point for China-Korea Relations?” Comparative
Connections, vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2004), pp. 109-11.
issues: that dialogue can help parties in conflict to reach at least
some agreement about what happened in the past; and that an
ultimate agreement on the bare facts of what happened to whom
and when is unlikely to ever occur. No matter how successful
dialogical interactions between opposing sides are, they always
have to deal with the remainder, with positions that cannot be
subsumed into compromise or, perhaps, not even be apprehend-
ed from the vantage point of those who do not live and repre-
sent them. South Korea and Japan may never officially agree on
one common historical representation of the past.
Another form of ethics is necessary to deal with this prob-
lematic remainder—not an ethics of dialogue, but an ethics of
difference. The task ahead thus consists of articulating a form of
reconciliation that does not eradicate differences between two
sides, but seeks to establish a political environment in which these
differences can be accepted and lived out in a respectful and
nonviolent manner. Ethics then becomes a question of develop-
ing a relationship with the other side that displays understand-
ing of and respect for the other’s inherently different (and per-
haps incompatible) standpoint.39
Recognizing the existence of historical differences is thus a
crucial element in the effort to promote a culture of reconcilia-
tion between South Korea and Japan. Nietzsche refers to such
approaches as “critical histories”: attempts to challenge the
notion of a single historical reality and create the political space
in which diverging narratives of the past can compete with each
other, perhaps even respect each other despite the differences
that divide them. Numerous philosophers and historians stress
the importance of this point. Paul Ricoeur proposes that by
“acknowledging that the history of an event involves a conflict
of several interpretations and memories, we in turn open up the
future.”40 Linking an ethics of difference with a promotion of a
tolerant historical consciousness entails a variety of different
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dimensions. Dipesch Chakakrabarty uses the term “minority
histories” and refers to the need to protect various versions of
the past, even if they contradict each other and cannot be sub-
sumed into prevailing narratives of the nation.
Advancing an ethics of difference does not entail abandon-
ing the ability to judge, particularly when it comes to questions
of responsibility for Japan’s imperial ambitions and colonial
occupation of Korea. Not every version of the past can be sus-
tained. Although the content of a historical account is inevitably
intertwined with the values espoused by the narrator, a historian
cannot simply make up events and interpretations. Ricoeur seeks
to avoid an abuse of memory by grounding it in “what really hap-
pened.”41 This is, of course, an aspiration that inevitably remains
unfulfilled, for history is a form of representation, and a represen-
tation is always incomplete and, at least to some extent, distorted.
It cannot capture the object it represents as it is, devoid of percep-
tion and perspective. But Ricoeur stresses the need to supplement
historical memory with documentary and archival evidence. He
illustrates this inevitable combination between event and repre-
sentation, fact and narration, as follows: “You have to accurately
count the corpses in the death camps as well as offering vivid nar-
rative accounts that people will remember.”42
Even so-called postmodern historians stress the need for rules
of scholarship and verification. Hayden White, for instance, admits
that every historical narrative contains a “desire to moralize” the
event it seeks to capture. But to count as “proper history,” White
emphasizes, the narrative “must manifest a proper concern for the
judicious handling of evidence, and it must honor the chronologi-
cal order of the original occurrence of events.”43 Chakrabarty, like-
wise, defends the notion of “minority histories” while rejecting the
relativist position that may dismiss such accounts as purely per-
sonal or arbitrary. He stresses that an alternative memory of the
past can only enrich, or be absorbed into the mainstream historical
discourse if the following questions can be answered in the affir-
88 David Hundt and Roland Bleiker
41. Ibid., p. 12.
42. Ibid., p. 15.
43. Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical
Representation (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987),
pp. 4, 14.
mative: “Can the story be told/crafted? And does it allow for a
rationally defensible point of view or position from which to tell
the story?”44
Keeping these guiding lights in mind, the authors of the
History Opens the Future project could take their project one step
further. They could examine each historical period or event sepa-
rately, trying to find out which of the barest facts the three coun-
tries can agree on, and where exactly the remaining differences
are located. They could search for ways to turn the remaining
disagreements into situations through which differences between
the two sides can be seen as a normal, perhaps even enriching,
part of bilateral relations. At the same time one has to acknowl-
edge that if a historical approach based on an ethics of difference
is to be placed in the service of reconciliation, it has to go beyond
merely acknowledging that the two sides have different notions
of the past. Leaving it at that would only entrench existing antag-
onisms, and thus legitimize or even intensify the existing conflict.
An ethics of difference must seek to create the conditions under
which different identities can co-exist and explore commonali-
ties. Doing so is not easy, nor can it be reached overnight. Recon-
ciliation inevitably takes time. The pain of past events, such as
the memory of Japan’s colonial occupation, is deeply rooted in
societal consciousness. But an approach to reconciliation that
combines dialogue with respect for difference is likely to help the
respective societies sort out their differences in a nonviolent and
respectful manner. If Japan and South Korea were to pursue such
an approach with determination, then their so far rather tense
political relations will most likely take on a more conciliatory
nature.
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